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LARGE-SCALE DISASTERS ATTACKING THE 

AMERICAN DREAM: HOW TO PROTECT 

AND EMPOWER HOMEOWNERS 

AND LENDERS 

MATIHEW D. EKINS* 
INTRODUCTION 
A barrage of high-impact storms with torrential rains and vi­
cious winds pummeled the Gulf Coast states during the 2005 hurri­
cane season. Hurricane Katrina alone resulted in a large-scale 
disaster where over 1300 lives were lost, property owners suffered 
approximately $75 billion in property damage, and, in particular, 
uncertainty erupted between homeowners and lenders.! The finan­
cial costs do not recede for the 1.2 million displaced and distressed 
homeowners, as they try to repair their homes while continuing to 
* Matthew D. Ekins is a 2007 graduate from Indiana University School of Law in 
Indianapolis and a 2003 graduate of Utah State University. He worked in the real es­
tate title insurance industry for over two years as an escrow officer. The author thanks 
his wife, Andrea; father, David; and sister, Valarie, for their enduring encouragement 
throughout the life of this Article. He also thanks Professor Lloyd T. Wilson, Jr., for his 
sage advice on this Article. 
1. TImothy N. Brown, Dealing with Disasters: Real Estate Lessons from Katrina, 
PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 34, 34. 
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make their monthly mortgage payments.2 If homeowners falter in 
paying their mortgage debts, foreclosure is a likely result.3 
In 2002, one study estimated the lender foreclosure costs alone 
to be $58,759 per home.4 If only 500,000 of the affected homeown­
ers defaulted and lenders elected to foreclose, the lender costs, in 
addition to the property damage estimates, could reach $29 bil­
lion-more than one-third of the estimated Katrina-caused prop­
erty damage.5 
On a smaller scope, the average existing home value in 2004 
for the southeastern United States was $182,820.6 If a home re­
tained this value after the disaster, foreclosure costs would re­
present an estimated thirty-two percent loss in pre-disaster equity. 
Where the disaster caused "severe damage"-destruction of at least 
half of the home's value-foreclosure would likely result in a sixty­
four percent loss in the post-disaster equity.7 These estimates ex­
clude consideration of the amount of mortgage indebtedness se­
cured before the disaster, which the homeowner is still obligated to 
repay.8 
This Article examines, through a historical lens, the effects that 
large-scale disasters have had on the residential homeowner9­
lenderlO relationship and proposes relief provisions to better miti­
2. OFFICE OF POL'y DEV. AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN 
DEV., UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET CONDITIONS 1ST QUARTER 2006, at 5 (2006) 
[hereinafter UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET]. 
3. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 4­
5, 580-83 (4th ed. 2002). 
4. Amy Crews Cutts & Richard K. Green, Innovative Servicing Technology: Smart 
Enough to Keep People in Their Houses? 13 (Freddie Mac, Working Paper No. 04-03, 
2004), available at http://www.freddiemac.cominews/pdflfmwp_0403_servicing.pdf.In 
addition to the costs, the foreclosure process takes an average of eighteen months. Id. 
5. Brown, supra note 1, at 34. 
6. FREDDIE MAC, 2007 REPORTER FACT BOOK 43-44 [hereinafter 2007 RE­
PORTER FACT BOOK], available at http://www.freddiemac.comlnews/factbook/pdfl 
reporter-factbook. pdf. 
7. See UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET, supra note 2, at 5. The Federal Emer­
gency Management Agency estimates that 125,731 homes suffered severe damage, 
179,378 homes suffered major damage, and 892,390 homes suffered minor damage. Id. 
at 6. 
8. For example, in a worst case scenario, the financing obtained immediately 
before the hurricane would leave the mortgage 100% undersecured because of home 
damage and substantially bar recovery of lender expenses if foreclosed. 
9. "Homeowner," in this Article, inclusively refers to mortgagor, buyer, and land 
owner when applicable in the appropriate context. 
10. "Lender," for purpose of this Article, combines references to mortgagee, 
bank, mortgage broker, mortgage company, savings and loan company, and other gov­
ernmental lending institutions. 
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gate financial loss and avoid the burden resulting from foreclosure. 
First, an examination of the Great Depression looks at problems 
that contracting parties faced, measures implemented by state and 
federal authorities, and lasting consequences arising from that era. 
Next, the Article asserts that legislatures should implement a stan­
dardized framework from which homeowners and lenders can ef­
fectively mitigate loss arising from large-scale disasters. Finally, the 
Article specifically addresses two measures: a workout plan and a 
cramdown provision. In the wake of large-scale disasters, direct 
loss is inevitable; minimization of the indirect, corollary loss relies 
upon humanity's acumen. In considering the efficacy of mitigation 
measures to recover from a large-scale disaster, organizing stan­
dardized relief provisions fosters the necessary post-disaster per­
spective for the homeowner and lender, and preserves, although 
not perfectly, both parties' prevailing contractual interests. 
I. HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
"[M}ortgages on single family homes [are} the 'backbone of the 
American financial system. '''11 
A. Prevalent Conditions During the Depression 
The Great Depression was an economic crisis in American his­
tory, which is unrivaled in scope and effect to this day. 12 It affected 
millions of homeowners and pushed lenders toward insolvency.B 
The mortgage debt totaled forty-three billion dollars, which was ap­
proximately three times the railroad debt, four times the long-term 
industrial debt, and comparable to the federal, state, county, and 
municipal debt.14 In 1932, nearly 250,000 mortgages were fore­
closed upon nationwide, and, in 1933, the rate of foreclosure ex­
ceeded 1000 homes per day.15 Because of the economic 
circumstances that ultimately resulted in foreclosure, many proud 
11. Fred Wright, The Effects of New Deal Real Estate Residential Finance and 
Foreclosure Policies Made in Response to the Real Estate Conditions of the Great De­
pression, 57 ALA. L. REV. 231, 242 n.76 (2005) (quoting Ronald Tobey et aI., Moving 
Out and Settling In: Residential Mobility, Horne Owning, and the Public Enfrarning of 
Citizenship, 1921-1950, 95 AM. HIST. REV. 1395, 1417 (1990) (quoting Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Campaign Address on the Eight Great Credit Groups of the Nation (Oct. 
21,1932), in 1 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 829 
(1938))). 
12. Id. at 239. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
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homeowners were reduced to being economic serfs on the land that 
they previously owned.16 
Many factors precipitated the harsh reality that existed during 
the 1930s. William Prosser noted the drastic near collapse of com­
modity prices that fell below the producers' break-even pointP 
The inflating dollar, coupled with these circumstances, resulted in 
increased residential mortgage default when mortgage balloon 
notes, the industry standard at the time, matured.18 The inevitable 
default resulted in a rapid increase in the number of foreclosure 
sales, which depressed the market because of the surplus of fore­
closed homes.19 In addition, the large inventory of foreclosed 
homes chilled competitive bidding at sheriff's sales, and encouraged 
lenders to bid nominal prices and seek a deficiency judgment for 
the remaining balance nearly equal to the mortgage debt,2° 
Homeowners confronted this mounting crisis by implementing 
self-help measures. The "penny sale" was one remedial measure 
used in Minnesota.21 When a farmer's personal property was up for 
bid at the sheriff's sale, neighboring farmers would band together 
and purchase the property for pennies, then resell the property 
back to the original foreclosed farmer at a nominal price.22 
Some courts took matters into their hands by imposing an "up­
set price. "23 The courts would establish a floor price and the fore­
closed property could be sold only at or above that predetermined 
minimum price.24 However, these efforts alone were not enough to 
curb the housing crisis.25 Beginning in the early 1930s, the public 
16. Roland C. Amundson & Lewis J. Rotman, Depression Jurisprudence Revis­
ited: Minnesota's Moratorium on Mortgage Foreclosure, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 805, 
822 (1984). 
17. William L. Prosser, The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium, 7 S. CAL. L. REv. 
353, 354 (1934). 
18. Id. at 345; see also Harold F. Breimyer, Agricultural Philosophies and Policies 
in the New Deal, 68 MINN. L. REV. 333, 334 (1983) (crisis on the farms stirred national 
debate for farm relief). As Prosser noted, "[a] survey of farm mortgages in Minnesota 
... indicated that, in 1930,53.8% of the owner-operated farms in Minnesota were mort­
gaged." Prosser, supra note 17, at 354 n.10. For a description of a balloon note see 
infra note 79. 
19. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 822. 
20. Prosser, supra note 17, at 354-55. 
21. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 822. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
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placed pressure on lawmakers to take steps to ameliorate the me­
tastasizing crisis.26 
B. State Legislative Response to Alleviate Increasing Foreclosures 
In response to public sentiment, Minnesota lawmakers enacted 
a mortgage foreclosure moratorium,27 which granted some degree 
of relief to defaulting homeowners.28 This type of legislation ex­
panded into other states.29 The validity of the mortgage foreclosure 
moratorium was premised on the legislative declaration of an eco­
nomic emergency that qualified the passage of such legislation.3D 
The landmark case Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell 
established the mortgage foreclosure moratorium law as a valid, 
reasonable relief measure for homeowners facing foreclosure.31 
Blaisdell involved the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law (Mor­
atorium Law), which the state's legislature passed on April 18, 
1933.32 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the Moratorium 
Law as valid,33 but its decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.34 The Court considered whether the asserted right to imple­
ment the emergency legislation modifying mortgage provisions con­
flicted with the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
prohibiting impairment of contractual obligations.35 
The Moratorium Law provided that, during times of a declared 
economic emergency, judicial relief could extend foreclosure court 
proceedings, sales could be postponed for a finite period, and the 
redemption period could be extended.36 Where the district court 
granted extended foreclosure relief, the homeowner was required 
to pay either income generated by the property, if applicable, or a 
26. Id. at 822-23. 
27. /d. at 822-24. The Governor of Minnesota first acted in response to the de­
mand of public outcry. Id. at 823. Governor Olson issued an executive order that pro­
hibited sheriff sales until the legislature had adjourned. Id. This order was later 
declared unconstitutional. Id. at 824. However this was an impetus for state legisla­
tures taking action by passing moratorium legislation. Id. 
28. See Wright, supra note 11, at 240. 
29. Id. at 241. 
30. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 824. 
31. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
32. See id. at 415-16. 
33. Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 893, 894 (Minn. 1933) (per 
curiam), affd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
34. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416. 
35. Id. at 425; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
36. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 416. 
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reasonable rental value to the lender as determined by the court.37 
The Moratorium Law included a sunset provision that limited its 
availability to this particular declared emergency and not beyond 
May 1, 1935, two years after passage.38 It was this law that im­
pacted the Blaisdell family during the Great Depression. 
The Blaisdell family owned a fourteen-room home encum­
bered by a mortgage lien held by Home Building & Loan Associa­
tion.39 The Blaisdells' subsequent default resulted in a foreclosure 
sale on May 2, 1932, where the lender purchased the residence for 
$3700.98, while the reasonable market value was $6000.40 The 
Blaisdell family would lose all equity and the right to redeem one 
year later on May 2, 1933.41 
The Supreme Court quoted Justice Olsen of the Minnesota Su­
preme Court who stated: 
"The present nation wide and world wide business and financial 
crisis has the same results as if it were caused by flood, earth­
quake, or disturbance in nature. It has deprived millions of per­
sons in this nation of their employment and means of earning a 
living for themselves and their families; ... it actually has re­
sulted in the loss of their homes by a number of our people and 
threatens to result in the loss of their homes by many other peo­
ple in this state ...."42 
In upholding the Moratorium Law, the Supreme Court found 
that the statute did not impair the integrity of the remaining mort­
gage debt, and that interest continued to accrue.43 Further, it found 
that the Moratorium Law did not disturb the lender's right to fore­
close and seek a deficiency judgment. The only redemption condi­
tion altered was time, which was extended.44 The rental value paid 
applied to taxes, insurance, and interest.45 
37. Id. at 416-17. 
38. Id. at 416. 
39. Id. at 419-20. The extra rooms provided income when the family used them 
for room and board. /d. at 420. 
40. Id. at 419. The Blaisdell family argued that, in addition to the loss of their 
home, they would also lose the equity in the home. Id. The foreclosure sale covered all 
outstanding debt and arrearage fees. Id. at 419-20. 
41. Id. at 419. 
42. Id. at 423 (quoting Blaisdell v. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 249 N.W. 334, 340 
(Minn. 1933) (Olsen, J., concurring), affd, 290 U.S. 398 (1934». 
43. Id. at 425. 
44. /d. 
45. Id. 
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The Supreme Court's ruling rested upon five essential ele­
ments.46 First, the existence of an emergency was reason to protect 
vital community interests.47 Second, the legislation addressed "a le­
gitimate end," which was the "protection of legitimate social inter­
est."48 Third, relief was based on appropriate and reasonable 
conditions.49 Fourth, conditions to extend the redemption period 
could not be unreasonable and must consider the interest of home­
owner and lender.50 Fifth, the moratorium legislation was limited 
in duration, not lasting beyond the emergency.51 
Blaisdell suggests that in a time of crisis, the Constitution 
should be interpreted to "comfort" citizens, rather than "pinch" 
them.52 The Moratorium Law provided a mere modification of the 
remedy available to the lender, while upholding the homeowner's 
legal obligation of repayment.53 It afforded the comfort, in terms of 
time needed to cure the problem, rather than having the home­
owner feel the pinch of a valid contractual obligation upheld in ex­
treme circumstances. In this way, the law recognized that the 
victims were not at fault and placed in circumstances beyond their 
control and afforded assistance where possible.54 
C. Federal Response to the Great Depression 
In addition to state legislative response, the federal govern­
ment sought to ameliorate the growing crisis with administrative 
measures.55 The federal government first used its financial might 
by injecting money into the mortgage industry to correct the hous­
ing disaster.56 However, the opening of the federal coffers had a de 
minimis impact on the housing crisis. 57. 
46. Id. at 444-47; see also Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 825-26. 
47. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444. 
48. Id. at 445. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 445-46. 
51. Id. at 447. 
52. See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emer­
gency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 734-35 (2006) (exploring the Constitution as "comforting" 
rather than a "barrier to public happiness"). 
53. See Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 819. 
54. See 131 CONGo REC. 16,927-28 (1985) (statements of Rep. De La Garza and 
Rep. Gunderson). 
55. Wright, supra note 11, at 241. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. Of the estimated 1.8 million applications for the federal HOLC, over half 
were either rejected due to lack of security or withdrawn before final review. Id. at 247. 
Only one in ten residential home owners received relief from foreclosure. Id. Al­
though the Federal Home Loan Bank Board sought to infuse money into the banking 
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1. Quashing the Crisis with Policy 
The federal government also implemented a policy approach 
that significantly reversed the housing market's foreclosure rate.58 
One of the first executive actions taken by newly elected President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was to provide relief to homeowners reeling 
from external market forces beyond their controp9 Two months 
after taking office, President Roosevelt signed the Home Owners' 
Loan Act into law.60 This Act created the Home Owners' Loan 
Corporation (HOLC).61 The fundamental premise of the program 
was to "(1) protect small homeowners from foreclosure, (2) relieve 
them of part of the burden of excessive interest and principal pay­
ments incurred during a period of higher values and higher earning 
power, and (3) declare that it was national policy to protect home 
ownership."62 
The HOLC operated by providing federally backed HOLC 
bonds in exchange for defaulted home mortgages.63 The bonds 
generally had a lower interest rate than residential mortgage rates, 
and the HOLC guaranteed principal and interest payments.64 The 
HOLC refinanced approved homeowners, consolidating all arrear­
ages, fees, and back taxes.65 The refinanced loan interest payments, 
subject to the HOLC's approval, could be delayed up to three 
years, thereby providing relief from the threat of foreclosure until 
the economy improved.66 
To the mortgage industry's detriment, Congress included limit­
ing measures on the HOLC's lending practices.67 Financiallimita­
tions included total funding of $4.75 billion in bonds during three 
years, interest rates no greater than four percent, and a loan matur­
ity limit of eighteen years.68 Other binding provisions required that 
industry, of the 41,000 homeowners that applied, only three applications were ap­
proved. Id. at 241. 
58. Id. at 246. 
59. Id. at 242. 
60. Id.; see Home Owners' Loan Act of June 13, 1933, 12 U.S.c. § 1461 (2000). 
61. Wright, supra note 11, at 242. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 242-43. 
66. Id. at 243. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
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the value of residential property exceed $20,000 and the loan 
amount be no greater than eighty percent of the appraised value.69 
On average, homeowners who qualified for the HOLe assis­
tance were in default for two years on the original note and mort­
gage and nearly three years behind on property tax payments.70 
Even though the HOLe helped many homeowners, foreclosures 
still occurred on 2.5% of all of the HOLC's loans.11 However, two­
thirds of foreclosures resulted from the homeowner's unwillingness 
to cooperate with the HOLe when it estimated that the home­
owner had the ability to pay.12 
2. Policy and Rulemaking Response 
One year after signing the Home Owners' Loan Act, President 
Roosevelt successfully lobbied for the National Housing Act of 
1934 (Housing Act).73 The Housing Act did not allocate aid­
rather, it laid the foundation for indirect administrative measures to 
accelerate recovery.74 The Housing Act created the Federal Hous­
ing Administration (FHA), which served as a catalyst to implement 
policy tailored to revive the ailing mortgage industry.75 
The FHA implemented revolutionary standards in the mort­
gage industry. It offered deficiency insurance of up to twenty per­
cent of the loan amount so long as the private lender met federally 
mandated criteria.76 Borrowers paid a one-half percent fee in addi­
tion to the standard interest rate, which the FHA deposited into a 
reserve fund used to cover mortgage deficiencies.77 The FHA also 
69. Id. The HOLe molded the way in which appraisals were done and how the 
lending institutions utilized this developing discipline. Id. The end result was a greater 
standardization of the real estate appraisal. Id. The change also resulted in the redlin­
ing of more "risky" neighborhoods. Id. 
70. Id. at 249. 
71. Id. When the borrower defaulted, the HOLe exercised broad restraint in 
filing a deficiency judgment against the borrower, unless the borrower was clearly able 
to pay, or state law mandated that the HOLe seek a deficiency judgment to protect its 
property interest. Id. at 250. 
72. Id. at 249. 
73. Id. at 251. 
74. Id. 
75. See Adam Gordon, The Creation of Home Ownership: How New Deal 
Changes in Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessible to 
Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE LJ. 186, 193 (2005) ("[T]he federal 
government enabled lenders to provide home mortgage credit without any risk of 
loss-a vital guarantee given how much money those lenders had lost in the foreclo­
sures of the early Depression."). 
76. Wright, supra note 11, at 251. 
77. Gordon, supra note 75, at 193. 
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progressively lowered the standard requirement for down pay­
menU8 In exchange, the lender offered borrowers fully self-amor­
tized loans79 with a high loan-to-value ratio, typically eighty 
percent.80 One of the more important benchmarks of the Housing 
Act was the fact that it did not require a large amount of federal 
funding.81 Instead, borrowers paid for the program by paying a 
mortgage insurance premium integrated into the monthly principal 
and interest payments.82 
The same authority that permitted the FHA to insure mort­
gages83 emboldened the FHA to stipulate construction standards 
like setbacks, cul-de-sacs for residential neighborhoods, and sepa­
rate zoning for commercial and residential property.84 The FHA 
clamped down on usurious interest rates on second mortgages and 
limited lender and builder fees.85 The FHA requirements made 
borrowing for residential homeowners less expensive and less 
risky,86 and demand for new homes and new capital grew.87 
In response to the residential industry crisis of the Great De­
pression, systemic changes occurred in legislation, administrative 
78. Id. However, these changes were not completely for the better. While a 
lower down payment allowed younger homeowners access to mortgage funds, it also 
increased the likelihood of loss in default. Id. at 193-94. Where little equity exists in 
the home and there is a dramatic drop in property value, the borrower has little incen­
tive to keep the house and is likely to walk away. Id. at 194. 
79. Wright, supra note 11, at 251. Before the mortgage industry changed during 
the Great Depression, most mortgages were short-term-between three and five years. 
Id. at 246; see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 2. Moreover, the loans were not 
amortized. Id. This type of loan is commonly referred to as a balloon loan. Id. The 
balloon loan was problematic during the Great Depression because homeowners were 
frequently unable to refinance the mortgage when the mortgaged "ballooned" at the 
end of the term. Wright, supra note 11, at 246. The HOLe offered fifteen-year amor­
tized loans, a drastic change from the industry standard. Id. The belief was that as 
equity grew, the likelihood of default decreased. Id. An amortized loan spreads princi­
pal and interest payments over the life of the loan. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra 
note 3, at 2-3. The monthly payment is fixed with the payment ratio of principal to 
interest incrementally increasing with each pay period. See id. 
80. Wright, supra note 11, at 25I. 
81. See id. 
82. Id. 
83. See Gordon, supra note 75, at 193. 
84. Wright, supra note 11, at 257. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. at 260; see also Gordon, supra note 75, at 194. Much pressure also 
came from developers, builders, and other related business that were hit hard by the 
Depression. /d. These entities relied heavily on the housing market and available 
capital. 
87. Wright, supra note 11, at 260. 
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rule making, and in the private lending system.88 Generally, foreclo­
sure moratorium laws expanded beyond Minnesota and provided 
legal delays in foreclosure proceedings. In addition, balloon note 
usage was replaced by the amortization of principal and interest 
over the life of the loan and government regulators integrated new 
requirements to stabilize the housing market.89 
II. STANDARDIZED FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE MITIGATION 
A. Introduction 
Empowering contracting parties in disaster recovery is essen­
tial. The previous historical analysis exemplified what was less ef­
fective-congressional funding of lending institutions. It also 
illuminated what was more effective-rules and guidelines giving 
direction to homeowners and lenders.90 This knowledge is para­
mount in developing modern measures to address disaster recovery. 
The comparison exhibits a valuable predictive function of what will 
hedge against loss and hasten recovery. 
The current pervasive notion is that homeowners must make 
all mortgage payments on time or the lender will foreclose on the 
property.91 In reality, the industry is not so absolute.92 We-soci­
ety, local, and national governments-should resist the routinely in­
grained response to solely give financial assistance. Instead, we 
should enact a framework that empowers those affected by large­
scale disasters. The difficult balance is to respect the contracting 
parties' rights while attempting to assist both parties.93 Considera­
tion of less-effective and more-effective mitigation measures will 
manifest workable standardized relief provisions that will create the 
88. Id. at 250. 
89. Id. 
90. As the book of Acts illustrates: a lame man sat before the temple asking for 
alms and Peter said, "Silver and gold have I none, but such as I have give I unto thee. 
In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth rise up and walk." Acts 3:1-7. The lame man 
immediately received strength in his feet and ankles, arose, and walked. [d. at 3:7-8. 
Peter helped this man by a blessing of health, not by fleeting monetary aid. 
91. See infra text accompanying notes 134-135. 
92. Id. 
93. See generally Robert R. Rosenthal, The Role of Courts of Equity in Prevent­
ing Acceleration Predicated upon a Mortgagor's Inadvertent Default, 22 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 897, 898-99 (1971) (" '[S]tability of contract obligations must not be undermined 
by judicial sympathy,' and ... 'the interests of certainty and security in real estate 
transactions forbid us, in the absence of fraud, bad faith or unconscionable conduct, to 
recede from the doctrine that is so deeply imbedded in equity.'" (quoting Grafv. Hope 
Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 885 (N.Y. 1930»). 
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necessary post-disaster perspective for the homeowner and lender 
while modifying pre-disaster contractual rights and obligations. 
B. A Forward-Looking Standardized Response 
Consistent, standardized relief provisions will improve the mit­
igation of financial loss arising from a large-scale disaster, and in­
crease lender profit.94 Like the FHA's success during and after the 
Great Depression, rule making for standardized relief provisions 
will do more to recover from a large-scale disaster than simply 
opening the federal and state coffers to cure the ailment.95 Stan­
dardized relief provisions are a starting point that do not exist in 
many mortgage forms, and are feasible mitigation tools that dimin­
ish clouds of uncertainty that abruptly appear after a catastrophe. 
Equity and loan conditions may be changed, in favor of both par­
ties, to accommodate new circumstances resulting from a 
catastrophe. 
If circumstances arising from a catastrophe cause homeowners 
to stumble into default and foreclosure results, the lenders' direct 
financial losses are significant.96 Furthermore, indirect foreclosure 
costs accumulate: Homeowners incur expenses during foreclosure, 
home values in corresponding neighborhoods become depressed, 
and state and local governments lose tax revenue.97 The cumulative 
estimated costs total $73,300 per foreclosure. 98 The ripple effect 
may also extend to municipal services and school systems that rely 
on property tax revenues.99 Having standardized relief provisions 
in place before disaster strikes will successfully mitigate post-disas­
ter loss, in particular, keeping foreclosure at bay. All this can be 
done at no or negligible direct costs to state or federal governments. 
94. Cf Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 13. 
95. See Gordon, supra note 75, at 192-94. 
96. See supra text accompanying note 5. With the possibility of a wave of foreclo­
sure looming, Washington lawmakers are determining whether or not the government 
should intervene and rescue the struggling mortgage industry. Edmund L. Andrews, In 
Washington, Measuring a Lifeline, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2007, at Cl. Interestingly, the 
wave is estimated to hit close to the elections, thus providing more incentive for politi­
cians to take a closer look at the situation. Id. Some Democrats are hoping for changes 
that will shift the balance of power between borrowers and lenders. /d. 
97. Desiree Hatcher, Foreclosure Alternatives: A Case for Preserving Homeowner­
ship, PROFITWISE NEWS & VIEWS, Feb. 2006, at 2-3, available at http://www.chicagofed. 
orglcommunity _developmentlfiles/02_2006_foreclosure_alt. pdf. 
98. Id. at 3 (breaking down costs of a foreclosure as follows: homeowner, $7200; 
lender, $1500; servicer, $1100; FHA-HUD, $26,500; city, $27,000; and neighbors, 
$10,000). 
99. See id. at 2-3. 
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C. Inefficient Disaster Response Happens 
On January 17, 1994, a 6.7 magnitude earthquake struck the 
densely populated community of Northridge, California.lOo The 
Northridge quake left Sondra Sutherland's Northridge residence 
uninhabitable and she was forced to vacate her premises while ma­
jor repairs were performed.lOl As a result of the earthquake's dam­
age, the home's value plummeted to approximately $51,000.102 
Sutherland had purchased this condominium in 1992 for $105,000 
and had executed a mortgage for $101,000, which was transferred to 
Barclays American/Mortgage Corporation for servicing.103 
Sutherland communicated with a lender representative three 
days after the earthquake and they agreed to "stop" the account 
while she rented an apartment during the repairs.I04 The stop con­
sisted of no monthly payments due, no notices of default, and no 
reporting to credit agencies.I05 Sutherland relied upon this oral 
agreement for a three-month stop and reallocated her funds to pay 
for earthquake-related costs during the period of the stop.106 
Contrary to Sutherland's belief that the postponed payments 
would be added to the end of the loan period, the lender billed 
Sutherland for all outstanding back payments along with the cur­
rent monthly payment. I07 The lender threatened foreclosure if 
Sutherland failed to bring the mortgage current.lOS Subsequently, 
Sutherland brought an action for a declaratory judgment to clarify 
the oral agreement and to enjoin the lender from foreclosing.109 
The confusion arising from the ambiguity of the terms of the 
oral "stop" agreement resulted in default by the borrower, costly 
litigation fees for both parties, and near foreclosure on Sutherland's 
condominium.110 These problems would have been averted had a 
standardized framework been in place before the earthquake. A 
standardized framework fosters certainty in communication, facili­
tates more efficient and quicker responses to a vital community in­
100. Sutherland v. Barclays Am. Mortgage Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614, 617 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1997). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 617 n.1. 
103. Id. at 617. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 618. 
109. Id. at 619-20. 
110. Id. at 618. 
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terest, and forbears impending foreclosure proceedings to give 
homeowners the opportunity to get back on their feet. The frame­
work gives homeowners and lenders a better chance to mitigate loss 
and shorten recovery time. 
D. Standardization Is Necessary 
Standardization of disaster response for lenders and homeown­
ers provides controlled flexibility during catastrophes, instead of re­
quiring parties to navigate the complex existing laws that are not 
structured to respond to such disasters.11l A standardized response 
plays a critical role in protecting and preserving the legitimate so­
cial interest of homeownership by mitigating loss without requiring 
additional allocation of taxpayers' dollars.112 Large-scale disasters 
give rise to unforeseen financial burdens flowing from circum­
stances beyond the homeowner's control.113 Providing uniform 
measures for homeowners to retain possession encourages them to 
repair and maintain the home that serves as collateral for the mort­
gage debt, instead of homeowners complacently allowing foreclo­
sure for twenty or fifty cents on the dollar.114 The value of lenders' 
collateral is retained and lenders avoid costly foreclosure proceed­
ings. Moreover, foreclosures can lead to greater long-term loss due 
to declining home prices and abandonment of homes.115 Individu­
ally and collectively, the mortgage industry avoids a depressed 
housing market. Standardized relief measures will "enable these 
families to remain on the land they love and in the communities 
that they have been a part of for generations."116 
111. 131 CONGo REC. 16,928 (1985) (statement of Rep. Gunderson). The flexibil­
ity will make it more likely that the family farmer can keep the farm. Similarly, flexibil­
ity will help the homeowner's likelihood of retaining the home. Cf id. 
112. Id. at 16,924 (statement of Rep. Synar). Congress found these arguments 
persuasive when passing the Chapter 12 bankruptcy relief provisions in response to the 
financial crisis farmers were facing in the 1980s. See generally 8 COLLIER ON BANK­
RUPTCY <JI 1200.01[2] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2007) 
(discussing the reasons behind passing Chapter 12). 
113. See 131 CONGo REc. at 16,927-28 (statements of Rep. De La Garza and Rep. 
Gunderson). 
114. See generally U.S. Small Bus. Admin., Federal Agency Regulatory Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, http://www.sba.gov/advo/re~katrina.html (last visited Sept. 9, 
2007) ("The Department of Housing and Urban Development has instructed all FHA­
approved lenders to provide foreclosure relief to FHA-insured families who are af­
fected by Hurricane Katrina. The relief includes a special 90-day moratorium on all 
foreclosures of FHA-insured properties in the declared disaster areas."). 
115. 131 CONGo REc. 16,928 (statement of Rep. Gunderson). 
116. Id. at 16,927 (statement of Rep. De La Garza) (debating in favor of 
cramdown relief provisions for American family farmers). 
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E. Triggers for Disaster Relief Assistance 
Disaster relief for the homeowner should be made available 
when circumstances substantially impair the homeowner's capacity 
to make short-term mortgage payments.117 A less effective alterna­
tive trigger is to award relief only when "equitable and just to do 
SO."118 
A relief trigger may take various forms.1 19 First, the con­
tracting parties can simply include contract terms that trigger mutu­
ally agreed upon disaster relief measures, which is similar to an 
acceleration remedy.120 Second, lawmakers can pass legislation de­
claring the application and availability of assistance to disaster vic­
tims.l2l Third, courts can order the disaster relief be made 
available.122 Finally, a gubernatorial proclamationI23 or a presiden­
tial declaration can enable relief measures via state and federal 
agencies, specifically for victims located in disaster areas.124 
Historically, some courts and agencies have looked at particu­
lar factual circumstances to determine whether the homeowner has 
an involuntary inability to pay, thus triggering relief measures.125 
Factors considered were significant property damage or deprecia­
tion, economic shock from a disaster, unemployment, underem­
ployment, illness, and death of a family member.126 The test has 
117. Austin J. Jaffe & Jeffery M. Sharp, Contractual Theory and Mortgage Fore­
closure Moratoria, 12 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 77, 79-80 (1996). 
118. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 831 n.156. 
119. The scope of what will trigger disaster relief should be dynamic enough to 
address a single residence flooded by a storm or an entire region devastated by a bar­
rage of hurricanes. The test should be a substantial impairment of the homeowner's 
ability to make short-term payments that is a result of circumstances beyond the home­
owner's control. 
120. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; see also Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uniform Instru­
ment, Louisiana, Single Family (Form 3019) [hereinafter Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uni­
form Instrument], available at http://www.freddiemac.com/uniformJunifsecurity.html 
(follow the "Form 3019: Louisiana Mortgage" hyperlink). The mortgage provides con­
ditional clauses controlling default, acceleration, and cure. [d. at 13. This form could 
expressly provide disaster remedies and identify under what conditions assistance can 
be made available to the homeowner in the event of a disaster. Id. 
121. See, e.g., Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 824. 
122. See Wright, supra note 11, at 240 (noting that one form of mortgage morato­
rium legislation gave the courts the authority to delay foreclosure proceedings). 
123. See supra text accompanying note 25; see also Proclamation No. 48 KBB 
2005, State of Louisiana Executive Department, State of Emergency-Hurricane Katrina 
(Aug. 26, 2005), available at http://www.blancogovernor.comJassets/docslProclamations/ 
48pro2005-Emergency-HurricaneKatrina.pdf. 
124. See Exec. Order No. 13,390, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,327 (Nov. 1,2005). 
125. See Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 831-33. 
126. Id. 
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not been a bright-line rule; rather, the decision maker has had the 
discretion to balance the facts and consider the circumstances. 
The "equitable" approach is vague, uncertain, and its results 
lack uniformity.127 It relies on political sentiments and notions of 
extraordinary relief.128 The "inability" approach quantifies param­
eters, and can be readily ascertained between homeowner and 
lender.129 It works better on a case-by-case basis, rather than 
broadly addressing large numbers of mortgages. 
Once the cumulative effects substantially impair a home­
owner's ability to meet short-term obligations, the relief measures 
should be triggered.130 Foreknowledge of disaster response triggers 
will allow lenders and homeowners to better gauge when relief 
measures will apply in the wake of an unforeseen disaster and when 
to implement such measures in a uniform manner.131 
F. Standardized Workout Plan 
While no statutory requirements currently exist for lenders and 
homeowners to use a workout plan to aid hurricane victims, Fannie 
Mae has encouraged servicers to use relief provisions.132 Using 
such relief provisions will protect the residential housing market, 
which President Franklin D. Roosevelt viewed as the "wheel within 
the wheel to move the whole economic engine. "133 
A workout plan is a tool used between a lender and a default­
ing homeowner to ensure repayment of the mortgage, but in terms 
127. See generally HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF 
EQUITY 47-49 (2d ed. 1948) (stating the historical reasons that equitable relief is used 
only when the remedy at law is inadequate). 
128. See generally id. (discussing how equitable relief is "extraordinary" not 
"ordinary"). 
129. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 831-33. 
130. See supra text accompanying note 117. 
131. The interest rate basically consists of two parts: the base and the amount of 
risk. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 2. The base is set by the market and the 
interest exceeding the base reflects what the company hopes to make and what the risk 
is worth to the lender. Id.; see also Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., 102 
F.3d 874, 876 (7th Cir. 1996). 
132. Letter from Pamela S. Johnson, Senior Vice President, Fannie Mae, to All 
Fannie Mae Single-Family Mortgage Sellers and Services (Feb. 14, 2006) [hereinafter 
Fannie Mae Letter, Feb. 14, 2006], available at http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ 
ssglannltrs/pdf/2006/ll0l06.pdf (reminding mortgage sellers and servicers of relief provi­
sions that should be used: forbearance, foreclosure moratorium, deed-in-lieu of foreclo­
sure, and limited circumstances for foreclosure). Fannie Mae also encouraged waiver of 
any prepayment penalty if the mortgage was to be paid off by insurance proceeds. Id. 
133. Wright, supra note 11, at 250. 
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alternative to the original note.134 Notably, this malleable tool 
seeks to overcome a pervasive paradigm regarding residential mort­
gages: Either the homeowner is current with all payments or one 
missed payment results in a lender's absolute right to foreclose. 135 
The mortgage industry is in the beginning stages of overcoming this 
stigma as evidenced by empirical data on the success rate of 
workout plans used to prevent foreclosure. Workout plans resulted 
in an eighty percent reduction in the probability of home loss 
among all loans and a sixty-eight percent reduction in loss for low­
and moderate-income homeowners.136 Concerning the 2005 Gulf 
Coast hurricanes, Fannie Mae has utilized workout agreements con­
sisting of forbearance for a determined period of time, foreclosure 
moratorium on residences located in the hardest hit counties, and 
refraining from reporting delinquencies to credit bureaus.137 
Legislation requiring workout plans may not be necessary. 
The parties have the ability to modify the contract and some lend­
ers have offered workout plans on their own volition.138 Some 
states permit lenders to begin foreclosure seven months after accel­
eration of the loan, which may be adequate time for homeowners to 
resolve their problems.139 Some may even argue that legislated 
workout agreements should not occur because such legislation vio­
lates the sanctity of contract.140 
While lenders and homeowners may modify the agreement, 
the lender maintains superior bargaining power because the mort­
134. Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 5-6. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 21, 23. 
137. Fannie Mae Letter, Feb. 14, 2006, supra note 132. 
138. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of 
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and 
Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 870 (2006) (describing the relation between the 
standard-form contract and parties' power to bargain and that the form is crucial to 
maintain the relationship). 
139. To sell a house in Illinois, for example, one must wait the longer of seven 
months from the date of filing or three months from the date of judgment. 735 ILL. 
COMPo STAT. 5/15-1603 (West 2006). Similarly, in Vermont: 
No sale of a dwelling house of two units or less when currently occupied by the 
owner as his or her principal residence may take place within seven months of 
service of the foreclosure complaint, unless the court finds that the occupant is 
making waste of the property or the parties mutually agree after suit to a 
shorter period. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531a (2002). 
140. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n V. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,448-82 (Suth­
erland, J., dissenting) (arguing an advancing gradual encroachment upon the sanctity of 
private and public contracts). 
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gage is an adhesion contract.141 Moreover, the lender is currently 
not required to offer any workout agreement. The lender-home­
owner relationship is analogous to the railway worker-railroad com­
pany relationship. Congress recognized the significance rail 
transportation had on the economy.142 The Railway Labor Act 
(RLA) reflected Congress's effort to foster economic peace be­
tween railroad labor and management.143 Harm from railway dis­
putes reverberated throughout the economy.144 Just as the RLA 
provided regulatory stability to a vital area of the economy, stan­
dardized relief provisions offer similar stability to the residential 
housing industry by providing better mitigation of loss incurred 
from a large-scale natural or economic disaster. 
Justice Holmes rightly declared that" 'experience'" is the" 'life 
of the law,'" and no experience is greater than crisis or emer­
gency.145 Times of crises demonstrate certain formalities of the law 
inevitability yield practical solutions to human problems.146 In fact, 
lenders increasingly use workout agreements to avoid additional 
10ss.147 Lenders voluntarily turned to workout plans for 155,495 de­
linquent mortgages in 2004; and in the first quarter of 2005 alone 
recognized a significant increase to 89,741, approximately a forty­
three percent increase.148 While lenders are making efforts to man­
age the current stream of delinquent loans, current number of 
141. See generally Conn. Light & Power Co. v. DaSilva, 650 A.2d 551, 555 (Conn. 
1994); Home Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Algona v. Campney, 357 N.W.2d 613, 619 
(Iowa 1984); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 746 (Md. 2005). 
142. By congressional authority, the President of the United States took over all 
railroad operations on December 28, 1917, until Congress restored power to the rail­
road companies through the Transportation Act of 1920. Pa. RR Co. v. U.S. RR 
Labor Bd., 261 U.S. 72, 73 (1923). Peace between labor and railway companies was 
'''of the highest public interest to prevent interruption of interstate commerce.'" Tex. 
& New Orleans RR v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 561 (1930) (quoting Pa. 
R.R. Co., 261 U.S. at 79). The Railway Labor Act of 1926 was "a fresh start" to achieve 
economic peace, and it repealed the Transportation Acts of 1913 and 1920. Id. at 563­
64. 
143. The Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 69-257, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) 
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.c. §§ 151-188 (2000)). 
144. 1 MICHAEL H. CAMPBELL & EDWARD C. BREWER III, THE RAILWAY LA­
BOR Acr OF 1926, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 216-17 (1988) (noting how transportation 
costs affect agricultural consumer goods). 
145. Levinson, supra note 52, at 726 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE 
COMMON LAW 1 (1881)). 
146. Id. at 727. 
147. E.g., Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16; Cutts & Green, supra note 4; 
Johnston, supra note 138. 
148. Johnston, supra note 138, at 871. 
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workouts is just a trickle compared to the massive delinquent reser­
voir from which they flOW. 149 
Overall, the workout plans implemented by legislation need to 
be consistent and sufficiently flexible in dealing with the legitimate 
social interest of homeownership.150 Measures discussed below can 
function individually or be combined with others to mold the miti­
gation response to each fact-sensitive situation. Ultimately, the 
workout plan should seek to balance the lender's contractual rights 
with the homeowner's interest to fulfill the contractual obligations 
and retain the home.151 
G. No- and Low-Cost Mitigation Measures 
A potential challenge to any mitigation measure is that a party 
may want to retain the initial contractual rights that were enjoyed 
prior to a catastrophe.152 The mitigation measure, by its very appli­
cation in post-disaster relief, changes the balance, mostly against a 
lender's interest. Some measures are easily implemented with in­
significant costs; but other measures have substantial financial con­
sequences for lenders. The lender's burden could be justified by 
the benefit to society of avoiding unconscionable results.153 An­
other view is that such measures discussed below are nominal in 
cost and do not impact a lender's right and ability to eventually 
receive repayment of the indebtedness. 
Pragmatically speaking, the homeowner should give something 
in return for the benefit of mitigation measures in post-disaster re­
lief. A simple way is to predetermine the value of a relief provision, 
associate a dollar amount with it, and apply the relief cost to the 
balance of the loan upon implementation. The cost can be a flat fee 
or a percentage of the loan.154 A percentage-based fee is a better 
option because it addresses the degree of risk the lender faces-the 
larger the loan, the more the lender may lose. The flat-fee scheme 
makes it more difficult to assess the value from loan to loan and 
more arbitrary to determine an amount. Similar to a common prac­
149. The volume of mortgage originations in 2004 was $2.7 trillion. 2007 RE· 
PORTER FACf BOOK, supra note 6, at 35. 
150. Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 13; see also Wright, supra note 11, at 242. 
151. L. Leon Geyer, Risk Sharing Down on the Farm: A Comparison of Farmer 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Statutes or Selling the Farm, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 331, 334 
(1997). 
152. Rosenthal, supra note 93, at 897, 912. 
153. Id. at 909. 
154. See supra text accompanying note 131. 
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tice to pay points or fees at closing to reduce an interest rate, a 
percentage-based relief provision bases the fee on the outstanding 
principal balance at the time of implementation.155 For some of the 
mitigation measures outlined below, it would be appropriate for the 
homeowner to pay for the relief option, rather than forcing the 
lender to shoulder the costs alone. 
1. Notice of Rights 
Some lenders currently use workout plans at their discretion. 
However, most homeowners have no notice or knowledge of the 
availability of such measures.156 Legislation should place an affirm­
ative duty on lenders to notify homeowners in disaster areas of 
what rights or options they have to manage a mortgage obligation 
in the wake of a crisis.157 Notice overcomes a real problem that 
unsophisticated homeowners face: not knowing what can be done 
after the disaster. Many homeowners fail to consider contingencies 
when signing financing documents. Lenders are in a better position 
to understand workout plans and educate customers. 
Legislation, however, may not be necessary since some lenders 
already communicate relief provision to homeowners.158 The con­
tractual agreement states obligations, rights, and remedies. The 
homeowner has a similar availability to communicate with the 
lender. Additional notice may be viewed as unnecessary because 
the contract already outlines remedies.159 Yet, mortgage terms and 
business practices are likely to vary within the industry and can be 
better managed by legislation. 
Notice overcomes the homeowner's mindset that lenders de­
mand each monthly payment without modification. The cost to 
lenders is insignificant, and the party's contractual obligations re­
main intact and unencumbered with such a simple term.160 
Mandatory notice to a homeowner that the lender may discuss the 
155. 15 U.S.c. § 1602(aa) (2000). 
156. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 849. Initially, the 1985 Minnesota 
moratorium law did not require that the homeowner be notified of statutory relief pro­
visions. Id. However, this was subsequently modified by the Minnesota Legislature in 
1986. See 1987 Minn. Laws ch. 292, § 36 (repealing MINN. STAT. §§ 583.01-.12, Minne­
sota's moratorium on mortgage foreclosures). 
157. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 849. 
158. Cf Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 6, 13 (stating that Fannie Mae strongly 
encouraged servicers to contact borrowers and determine their status of rebuilding, 
payoff indebtedness, or abandonment). 
159. See supra text accompanying note 120. 
160. Cutts & Green, supra note 4, at 3-4, 13. 
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modification of contract terms is a straightforward mitigation mea­
sure that needs no additional fees to implement. 
2. Credit Reporting Hold 
The industry lending practice is for lenders to report late or 
missed payments to credit bureaus. Another no-cost measure to 
mitigate loss would be for a lender to refrain from reporting missed 
payments due to a disaster to credit agencies.161 A hold on credit 
reporting acknowledges the impact of circumstances that exist be­
yond a homeowner's control and avoids creating an inaccurate rep­
resentation of the homeowner's credit fitness. 162 
While lenders generally reserve the right to report delinquent 
mortgage payments as leverage for repayment, this provision is not 
essential to the obligation for the homeowner to repay principal 
and interest.163 In the context of a disaster, a damaged credit rating 
decreases the likelihood that homeowners will obtain subsequent 
financing, rental housing, or other services based on credit rat­
ings.t64 Thus, the homeowner's financial fitness and character is 
under additional strain, and the inability to prevent foreclosure in­
creases. A hold on reporting a mortgage payment delinquency is 
likely to avoid this result. This relief provision can readily be imple­
mented with little cost to the lender. Thus, the homeowner should 
not be required to pay fees for such relief. 
3. Forbearance 
Forbearance is a relief measure that many lenders have utilized 
in response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes.165 Forbearance of 
mortgage payments can be a short-term suspension (one-to-three 
month) or long-term (four-to-twelve month) of mortgage pay­
ments.166 Repayment of the suspended payments may occur (1) at 
161. Letter from Pamela S. Johnson, Senior Vice President, Fannie Mae, to All 
Fannie Mae Single-Family Mortgage Servicers, at 2 (May 11, 2006) (reminding mort­
gage sellers and servicers not to report delinquency to credit repositories if missed pay­
ments were likely attributable to the hurricanes), available at http://www.efanniemae. 
com/sf/guides/ssglannltrs/pdf/2006/ll0306.pdf. 
162. Id. 
163. See generally 2007 REPORTER FACT BOOK, supra note 6, at 19-20 (discussing 
the options that homeowners have for nonpayments). 
164. Id. at 22-24. 
165. See Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uniform Instrument, supra note 120 (indicating 
that forbearance may be appropriate). 
166. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 843 (stating that delayed payments 
can be amortized back into the loan to reflect the homeowner's arrearages). Short-term 
repayment can be made at the end of the forbearance period, long-term payments can 
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the end of the forbearance period as a "balloon" payment or (2) 
after the maturity date is extended to the extent of the forbearance 
period.167 Government Security Enterprises (GSE) like Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac have strongly encouraged mortgage partners 
to temporarily forbear collection of principal and interest payments 
to those affected by Hurricane Katrina.168 
A temporary delay in a mortgage-indebtedness payment is a 
financial risk to the lender. The delay in payment, in effect, shifts 
the short-term recovery costs to the lender even though many mort­
gage agreements leave the onus for payment on the borrower.169 
While rarely recognized by courts, another risk a lender faces is 
forbearance acting as a waiver of the acceleration clause pO 
This "shock absorber" approach is unique because during for­
bearance the "middle man" protects mortgage investors and home­
owners at no additional government expenditure. Forbearance is a 
highly viable relief measure because of the elasticity provided by 
securitization in the secondary mortgage market. l71 GSEs have the 
capacity to absorb a large amount of non- or partial payments with 
no additional government funding, as illustrated by the current 
lender response to the 2005 hurricane season.172 This type of relief 
provision is more suited to charge a homeowner a percentage-based 
fee, which helps offset the strain on the lender resulting from the 
temporary stoppage of payments. 
4. Reverse Mortgages 
A reverse mortgage is another measure to provide relief to 
lenders and homeowners and to mitigate loss deriving from a disas­
ter.173 This mortgage tool has historically been used for elderly 
be amortized back into the loan or paid in full at the end of the period and, lastly, the 
loan can be negotiated and permanently modified in terms that the homeowner can 
afford. UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET, supra note 2, at 6. 
167. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 843. 
168. Silverman, supra note 163; Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uniform Instrument, 
supra note 120. 
169. Freddie Mac, Mortgage Uniform Instrument, supra note 120 ("Borrower 
shall pay when due the principal of, and interest on, the debt."). 
170. See generally Waiver of Right to Foreclose Mortgage, 148 A.L.R. 686 (1944). 
171. Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency 
Home Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 799-801 (2005). 
172. See supra text accompanying note 137. 
173. FANNIE MAE, HOME EQUITY CONVERSION MORTGAGE CONSUMER FACT 
SHEET (2004), available at http://www.fanniemae.com/global/pdf/homebuyers/hecm 
striper.pdf; see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, at 955-58. 
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homeowners who have a low debt-to-equity ratio,174 The "cash­
rich" home serves as collateral for the mortgage, and the lender 
makes monthly payments to the "cash-poor" homeowner by charg­
ing the payment against the home's equity,175 All the fees to imple­
ment this measure can be lumped into the loan when reversed. At 
the end of the loan period, the homeowner must pay the indebted­
ness in full or modify the loan terms. 
One drawback is the possibility of a sharp reduction in the 
home's equity caused by a disaster,176 Lenders require that the col­
lateral meet specific equity levels for this type of financial tool to be 
feasible,177 Without the equity cushion, the lender would shoulder 
an unreasonable amount of the risk.178 
However, in the cases where sufficient equity remains, tempo­
rary application of reverse mortgage principles ensures that full and 
timely payments are made to the lender and the homeowner does 
not default on the contractual obligation.179 The reverse mortgage 
is beneficial when the homeowner faces economic inability to make 
payments. An example would be if the homeowner's employer's 
business is destroyed or delayed and the homeowner has no income 
to pay the mortgage. The reverse mortgage avoids the high cost of 
government grants and regulatory oversight.180 Even though a re­
verse mortgage increases the lender's risk with a higher loan-to­
value ratio, the lender will receive monthly installments that would 
be in doubt without the application of the reverse mortgage. With 
174. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 844. This measure is ideal for eco­
nomic disasters where the homeowner is cash-poor and house-rich. !d. at 84S. 
17S. [d. at 844. For each transfer the loan balance will grow that amount of prin­
cipal and interest will be charged on that amount. [d. 
176. UNITED STATES HOUSING MARKET, supra note 2, at 6. Nearly three­
quarters of homes impacted by Hurricane Katrina suffered a loss in equity of up to half 
of the pre-disaster value. ld. 
177. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 844. 
178. ld. at 84S. Legislation or the parties would need to establish a minimum 
amount of equity necessary. [d. This base could be the amount needed for the home­
owner to resume payment or remedy the default. ld. For example, twelve months for a 
disaster small in scope where recovery is quicker and twenty-four months for a large­
scale disaster where relief is slow. Victims of Hurricane Katrina would generally fall 
under the twenty-four month period. 
179. ld. 
180. See generally Wright, supra note 11. The HOLe response to the Great De­
pression was to make a large amount of monies available for loans and the FHA imple­
mented regulation on the mortgage industry to improve the impoverished housing 
market. ld. Since Hurricane Katrina, the federal government has allocated $11.5 bil­
lion dollars in reconstruction efforts: $6.2 billion for Louisiana and $S.OS8 billion for 
Mississippi. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
119 Stat. 2680, 2779-80 (200S); Brown, supra note 1, at S1. 
374 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:351 
the homeowner remaining in the home, the collateral is pro­
tected.181 The homeowner could simply petition the court for statu­
tory exercise of the reverse mortgage, which avoids the increased 
burden of out-of-pocket mortgage payments during efforts to repair 
the home and provide alternative housing.182 
5. Disaster Default Insurance 
Mandatory mortgage default insurance is another possible 
measure to mitigate loss resulting from a disaster.183 Conceptually, 
default insurance is where an insurer continues to pay the monthly 
mortgage payments to the lender and the homeowner does not be­
come delinquent on the loan. In contrast to hazard insurance, it 
does not insure against loss to the physical structure, just payment 
for mortgage payments to prevent delinquency. This measure 
would insure against the homeowner's inability to pay the monthly 
mortgage payment due to circumstances beyond his control arising 
from a large-scale disaster.184 The homeowner would pay the pre­
mium along with the monthly payment of principal, interest, prop­
erty taxes, and hazard insurance.185 After a crisis, the homeowner 
would file a claim and the third-party insurer would pay the lender 
monthly mortgage payments, on behalf of the homeowner, for a 
predetermined period of time. Thus, lenders would receive their 
monthly mortgage payments, while homeowners could apply availa­
ble resources to recovery efforts without becoming delinquent on 
the loan. 
181. Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 845. Essentially the fictional trans­
fer from the lender to the homeowner serves as rent. Id. 
182. E.g., Sutherland v. Barclays Am. Mortgage Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 614, 617 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1997). If repairs are necessary, the homeowner's burden doubles: paying 
rent while fulfilling the obligation to make existing mortgage payments. All this is done 
while paying costs associated with the disaster: repairs, replacement of lost personal 
property, or additional travel expenses. Id. at 617-18. 
183. Generally, hazard insurance issues fall outside the purview of this Article. 
184. Homes & Communities, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 203(b) Mort­
gage Insurance, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsglsfhlins/sfh203b.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 
2007). If the mortgage enters default and the home is sold for less than the remaining 
mortgage debt, then the private mortgage insurance covers the shortage and the bor­
rower has no deficiency judgment looming. 
185. Homes & Communities, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., FAQs About 
Escrow Accounts for Consumers, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsglsfhlres/respafaq.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 16,2007) (describing the function and operation of the escrow account 
for the purpose of paying taxes and hazard insurance). 
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In theory, default insurance spreads the risk of loss across a 
greater base, thus, lessening the financial impact.186 The premiums 
paid by the homeowner would likely be minimal and provide relief 
to each policyholder at a critical juncture that would facilitate re­
covery for both individuals and the housing industry. In practice, 
however, this mitigation measure will ultimately fail. Historical ex­
perience with the hazard insurance industry teaches that insurance 
is too small a tool to deal with large-scale disasters. 
While insurance appears on its face to be a reasonable loss­
mitigation measure, disasters have exposed a flaw of home hazard 
insurance: magnitude.t87 For example, in 1992, Florida's hazard in­
surance claims from Hurricane Andrew exceeded some insurance 
companies' ability to cover the $17 billion in insured damage.188 As 
a result, policyholders "submitted 280,000 claims and recovered 
[only] $11 billion or 65 percent of total insured loss," while seven 
smaller insurers became insolvent.189 Florida's legislative response 
to the insurance failure created the state-run Residential Property 
and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association and the Florida Hur­
ricane Catastrophe Fund, which yield significant hope to mitigate 
the financial loss caused by future disasters.19o 
However, the underlying problem remains: the magnitude of 
large-scale disasters. Because of this issue, many insurance compa­
nies have already exited the industry. If private insurers offer disas­
ter default prevention policies, premiums are likely to be cost 
prohibitive. The state-run insurers have a finite fiscal capacity. At 
this time there is not a third line of defense against astronomical 
economic loss, leaving the insurance industry vulnerable. If a state 
institution is to shoulder the over-burdensome economic loss, gov­
ernment insolvency is a distinct possibility. 
The 1994 California Northridge earthquake resulted in $12.5 
billion in residential damage and overwhelmed insurers' financial 
186. DANIEL A. FARBER & JIM CHEN, DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND 
BEYOND 187-88, 193-95 (2006) (comparing default insurance to the operation of the 
federal disaster insurance program). 
187. [d. at 167-69 (outlining the disastrous results of Hurricane Andrew, the larg­
est natural disaster to date). 
188. Id. In 1992, Florida property insurers collected $1.5 billion in premiums. 
Claims paid out were ten times greater than premiums paid. Id. at 168. 
189. Id. at 167-68. Of the 300 insurers providing coverage before Hurricane An­
drew, thirty-four gave notice to state insurance regulators of the intent to withdraw 
permanently and twenty-nine insurers reduced their coverage options in Florida. Even 
the reinsurance companies limited coverage offered to Florida residents. Id. at 168. 
190. Id. at 167. 
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capacity to respond to the policyholders' claims.191 This natural dis­
aster resulted in ninety-three percent of earthquake insurers either 
drastically reducing hazard insurance or refusing to underwrite poli­
cies completely.192 Not only were Northridge earthquake claims on 
shaky ground, but reduction in participating insurers threatened the 
viability of the housing market and efforts to emerge from the cur­
rent economic recession.193 
Some insurance companies in the California residential indus­
try exited the market and the state government responded by creat­
ing a state-run insurance program.194 In 1996, California responded 
by organizing the California Earthquake Authority (CEA) as a pri­
vately funded, publicly managed program to insure against future 
earthquake 10ss.195 California, as a result of the autonomous CEA, 
is the largest residential earthquake insurer in the world.196 
Hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake resulted in 
unpaid or partially paid claims and essentially left the residential 
insurance market with few willing participants. One study esti­
mated that another hurricane, with the same force in the same loca­
tion as Andrew, would cause damages close to $70 billion-nearly 
double the 1992 figure.197 State government is now the insurer, and 
it is unclear whether the state insurance programs can satisfy future 
natural disaster claims. Should an exorbitant number of claims be 
submitted, who will bailout the state governments' insurance im­
plosion? State-sponsored social welfare policies should not extend 
to include this kind of insurance program because its sustain ability 
is unproven. Homeowners living in risk-prone areas should shoul­
der the risk when it arises, rather than requiring persons at much 
lower risk levels to assume heavy financial costs. 
For large-scale disasters, default insurance is a less effective 
mitigation measure. This type of insurance will fail to meet the 
191. California Earthquake Authority, http://www.earthquakeauthority.com (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2007). 
192. Id. To remedy the inability or exit of insurers, state government established 
state-run insurance programs with the caveat that once existing reserves are exhausted, 
no more relief is available. CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.30 (West 2005). 
193. California Earthquake Authority, supra note 191. 
194. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 186, at 197. 
195. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10089.5-.54. 
196. California Earthquake Authority, supra note 191. This only took two years. 
The CEA was created in 1995 and in 1997 it became one of the largest earthquake 
insurers. Cal. Earthquake Authority, History, http://www.earthquakeauthority.com! 
index.aspx?id=7&pid=1 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006). 
197. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 186, at 168. 
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overwhelming demand of claims filed by policyholders.198 In addi­
tion, insurance companies tend to limit coverage or withdraw from 
the insurance market after disasters, resulting in numerous and 
costly claims, thus leaving the homeowner, housing markets, and 
general economic health exposed and vulnerable.199 
III. THE HEAVY HAND OF CRAMDOWN LEGISLATION 
A. Introduction 
Historically, farmers have been afforded financial relief by 
means of a forced debt reduction.20o Lawmakers have often com­
pared the plight of farmers with that of homeowners.201 Homeown­
ers, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, suffered rapid home 
depreciation and undersecured debt just as farmers during the 
1980s experienced notable depreciation of land that led to under­
secured mortgage debt.202 
The Chapter 12 cramdown bankruptcy provision made availa­
ble for family farmers should also be available for homeowners.203 
Many perceive farmers as the backbone of America.204 Similarly, 
the residential mortgage industry, in the view of many, is essential 
to the American economy.205 During times of disaster and despair, 
public outcry has rung in the ears of lawmakers to assist the farmer 
and to assist the homeowner.206 A high number of farm foreclo­
198. The same pattern is beginning to emerge with the Gulf States. Southern 
District of Mississippi Judge L.T. Senter, Jr., ruled that a claim for damages from Ka­
trina's storm surge is not a valid claim under the hazard insurance policy. Leonard v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 438 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Miss. 2006), affd, 499 F.3d 419 (5th 
Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, Jan. 2, 2008; see Judge: Insurance Policy Excluded 
Flood Damage, MSNBC.coM, Aug. 15,2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14362386/ 
fromJET (last visited Aug. 15, 2006). The ruling could set the precedent for many pend­
ing and future insurance challenges, upholding the insurance industry's denial of bil­
lions of dollars in claims arising out of the hurricane's landfall. 
199. FARBER & CHEN, supra note 186, at 161. 
200. See generally James J. White, Taking from Farm Lenders and Farm Debtors: 
Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 J. CORP. L. 1 (1987). 
201. Geyer, supra note 151, at 333. 
202. Id.; see Brown, supra note 1, at 34. 
203. 11 U.S.c. §§ 1201-1231 (2000 & Supp. 2005) (codifying Bankruptcy Judges, 
United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 
100 S ta t. 3088). 
204. Farm Bankruptcy Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and the Sub­
comm. on Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 
at 2 (1986) [hereinafter Farm Bankruptcy Hearing] (statement of Rep. Michael Synar). 
205. Wright, supra note 11, at 242. 
206. See Amundson & Rotman, supra note 16, at 822-23 (describing the public 
sentiment for the governor and legislatures to help ailing farmers); Wright, supra note 
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sures depresses equity of adjoining farms, just as a high number of 
home foreclosures depresses equity in the residential community.207 
Congress should give the same degree of deference to homeowners 
recovering from a devastating catastrophe that it has offered to dis­
tressed family farmers. 
B. Congressional Cram down Precedent 
Secured-debt intervention dates back to the Depression era 
with the Frazier-Lemke Act.208 From 1935 to 1949, this legislation 
enabled the adjustment of farmers' debt by extension of repayment 
periods, moratorium on creditors' collection rights, and redemption 
of farms at current appraised values.209 In 1986, farmers received 
debt assistance under Chapter 12 which allowed bifurcating under­
secured debt into secured debt (the actual value) and unsecured 
debt (loan amount less the present value).210 
The farming credit crisis of the 1980s is another instance where 
lawmakers codified cramdown provisions.211 Nearly forty percent 
of owners' equity evaporated through land value depreciation from 
1981 to 1985.212 During this time, farm commodity prices were be­
low the cost of production, unemployment levels were near record 
highs, the dollar was strong, exports were weak, and interest rates 
were extremely high, leaving farmers in grave risk of losing their 
farms through foreclosure.213 
Even though lawmakers conditioned Chapter 12 with a sunset 
provision, Congress has consistently renewed the provision so that 
cramdown relief is still available to family farmers.214 Congress 
11, at 242 (showing Depression relief efforts in the form of money allocation and regu­
latory oversight). 
207. Farm Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note 204, at 32 (statement of Rep. Michael 
Synar). 
208. Geyer, supra note 151, at 334. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. White, supra note 200, at 1-2. 
212. 131 CONGo REc. 16,927 (1985) (statement of Rep. De La Garza); Farm 
Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note 204, at 83 (statement of Ewen M. Wilson, Deputy As­
sistant Secretary for Economics, U.S. Department of Agriculture). 
213. See Wright, supra note 11, at 806. 
214. See Act of Oct. 25, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-369, § 2(a), 118 Stat. 1749 (codified 
as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221 (2000»; Act of Aug. 15, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-73, 
§ 2(a), 117 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of Dec. 19, 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-377, § 2(a), 116 Stat. 3115 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); 
Act of May 13, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, tit. X, § 10814(a), 116 Stat. 532 (codified as 
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1221); Act of June 26, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-17, § 1, 115 Stat. 
151 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of May 11, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-8, 
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continues extending cram down provisions as a viable option for 
family farmers even though the general conditions present at the 
time of the initial passage no longer exist.215 Therefore, the 
cramdown is a tested and trusted means to protect a vital commu­
nity interest and to give family farmers a fighting chance to recover 
from economic disaster. This protection should be available to 
qualified homeowners who are affected by natural or economic 
disasters.216 
In response to the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes, Congress once 
again considered cramdown provisions.217 In the 2005 Baker Bill, 
which did not pass due to its complexity and efforts to acquire hur­
ricane damaged properties, the House considered offering the 
cramdown provision as a part of recovery efforts to Hurricane Ka­
trina.218 Concededly, Congress's action to forego the Baker Bill in­
dicates less inclination to give homeowners the same benefits as 
farmers. However, the cramdown provision is still of interest to 
other politicians. Louisiana state lawmakers are debating whether 
to enact similar cramdown measures for their citizens participating 
in the Louisiana Homeowner Assistance Program.219 
C. Basic Structure of Cramdown 
Chapter 12 permits "bifurcation of undersecured debt into se­
cured and unsecured debt."220 The secured amount is the post­
cramdown appraised value and the unsecured amount is the 
§ 1, 115 Stat. 10 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of Oct. 9, 1999, Pub. L. 
No. 106-70, § 1, 113 Stat. 1031 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of Mar. 
30, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-5, § 1(1), (2), 113 Stat. 9 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1221); Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, div. C, tit. I, § 149(a), 112 Stat. 2681­
610 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221); Act of Aug. 6, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-65, 
§ 1, 107 Stat. 311 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.c. § 1221). 
215. Act of Oct. 25, 2004 § 2(a). This relief provision has been extended for 
twenty years since its enactment in 1986. 
216. Some opposed to cram down measures argue that this measure is a "substan­
tial and retroactive alteration" of the lender's contractual rights and the homeowner's 
obligation. White, supra note 200, at 1-2. Furthermore, the cramdown hinders home­
owners' power to mortgage. ld. 
217. Louisiana Recovery Corporation Act, H.R. 4100, 109th Congo (2005); John 
A. Lovett, Rebuilding a Region: Housing Recovery Efforts in the Wake of Katrina and 
Rita, PROB. & PROP., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 49, 50. 
218. Lovett, supra note 217, at 50. 
219. [d. at 52. 
220. Geyer, supra note 151, at 334. 
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original mortgage amount less the secured post-disaster value.221 
Some terms, such as the amortization period and interest rate, may 
be changed under Chapter 12.222 The principal and interest pay­
ments are revised and based only on the secured debt.223 
The potent cramdown provision is not a remedial measure for 
all, especially those who are highly leveraged.224 The cramdown al­
ready passes a large unbargained-for loss to the lender. For highly 
leveraged financing, the lender takes a greater loss than a lower 
loan-to-value ratio would sustain. The highly leveraged home­
owner has less incentive to recapture equity owing to the lender. 
However, Congress, in its wisdom, made this provision available to 
family farmers even though it deprives the creditor from having the 
power to foreclose the land.225 
Reducing principal and interest payments based solely on se­
cured mortgage debt is a practicable solution that lessens the 
monthly payment burden on the homeowner and preserves the 
lender's share of future asset appreciation.226 Thus, foreclosure is 
less likely to occur because the lender's security is preserved and 
likely to appreciate while the homeowner continues making pay­
ments against the mortgage indebtedness. 
One drawback of the Chapter 12 cramdown provision is that it 
fails to recognize and secure any postcramdown appreciation of the 
collateral that appears under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.227 While appreciation is likely to be gradual, any increase 
must be recognized and secured.228 With time and effective re­
sources, most homeowners can regain pre-disaster equity, and this 
equity growth should be shared with the lender in the form of cor­
221. Id. The rewriting of the debt does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the 
lender's property rights because the reduced debt is what the lender would have re­
ceived from the foreclosure sale. Id. at 338. 
222. Id. at 334. 
223. Id. at 335. 
224. Farm Bankruptcy Hearing, supra note 204, at 49 (statement of Richard F. 
Stagmen). If the farmer has exceeded sixty percent debt-to-asset ratio, the cram down 
provision is not an appropriate remedy. Id. 
225. White, supra note 200, at 17. In this case, the lender's right to foreclose, for 
practical purposes, is not allowed under Chapter 12 cramdown. Home Bldg. & Loan 
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934) (upholding a Minnesota moratorium statute 
that was partially based on the reasoning that the right to foreclose was not eliminated). 
226. See Geyer, supra note 151, at 335-37 (noting that Chapter 12 merely pro­
vides the creditor the right to "request an equitable share of future asset appreciation"). 
227. White, supra note 200, at 8-9. 
228. Geyer, supra note 151, at 335. 
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relating secured security interests.229 Mortgage cramdown IS a 
more effective relief provision. 
D. Rationale for the Residential Mortgage Cramdown 
Reducing the secured debt and payments to pragmatic 
amounts reasonably and effectively balances both parties' interests. 
From the lender's perspective, the amount recovered at a foreclo­
sure sale would, in theory, equal the post-disaster value of the 
home, but would include administrative and legal costs to realize 
the sale.230 The cramdown measure reduces the secured debt to the 
level that the lender would recover at a foreclosure sale and avoids 
most administrative fees.231 Some costs arise in implementing the 
cramdown. Therefore, the secured debt maintains the lender's in­
terest in the value it would have received from foreclosure and 
costly foreclosure costs are not realized. The cramdown measure 
places the lender in a similarly situated position as an executed 
foreclosure action. In addition, home values are not decreasing, 
which results in larger profits from interest rates based on larger 
loan amounts. If lenders do foreclose, they remove their lender hat 
and begin to wear their property manager hat. Generally, however, 
lenders are not in the business of maintaining properties, assuming 
property liabilities, and disposing homes. 
From the homeowner's perspective, he retains ownership and a 
vested interest to rebuild and recover.232 A reduced mortgage pay­
ment facilitates the homeowner's ability to make monthly payments 
and, as a result, his financial well-being remains largely intact. Soci­
ety benefits because greater loss in home values is avoided. The 
difficult situation is dealt with between the parties and does not re­
quire societal financial assistance. Also, tax revenues are preserved 
because the property tax based on home values is not further re­
duced during the post-disaster period. 
Traditionally, lenders hold superior bargaining power over the 
homeowner by maintaining the threat of foreclosing on the security 
interest.233 In some instances the threat of foreclosure leads to the 
229. The argument made by creditors is that a debtor will use the cramdown pro­
vision when the market is depressed and then sell the land for a substantial profit when 
market prices increase. White, supra note 200, at 8-9. 
230. See Geyer, supra note 151. 
231. Id. at 335. 
232. Id. 
233. White, supra note 200, at 18-19. 
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forced sale of the home, giving credibility to the threat.234 In prac­
tice, the lender does not have or exercise superior bargaining power 
over homeowners because foreclosure threats made by lenders are 
seldom carried out.235 Moreover, the idea of sustaining the lender's 
threat of foreclosure is minimized because the existing industry par­
adigm is that homeowners must pay the mortgage; if not, the lender 
will foreclose.236 
The cramdown measure efficiently mitigates loss because crip­
pling foreclosure costs are not realized. Home value appreciation is 
more likely where the homeowner remains in the home with the 
incentive to repair and maintain the premises.237 Moreover, the ap­
preciation directly reduces or eliminates the problem of the mort­
gage being undersecured.238 
Another reason why a cramdown is efficient mitigation is that 
the lenders may adjust the interest rate according to risk when ini­
tially extending credit.239 Courts and legislators recognize that 
"[m]arket rates of interest measure the real risks of nonpayment 
and the costs of collection."24o Lenders are in the business of calcu­
lating risk and charging borrowers accordingly. The downside is 
that less credit is likely to be made available to homeowners, thus 
reducing homeownership afford ability. In response to the family 
farmer crisis during the 1980s, lenders with knowledge of cramdown 
measures kept interest rates at comparable levels and implemented 
more conservative lending practices for future loans.241 The codifi­
cation of the cramdown measure did not cause interest rates to 
spike like the lenders clamored it would.242 The farmers faced the 
same problem that confronts homeowners who would benefit from 
the cramdown: lenders extending less credit. A fewer number of 
homeowners would qualify for mortgage financing. 
234. Id. 
235. See 2007 REPORTER FACT BOOK, supra note 6, at 21. 
236. Id. at 2. 
237. Geyer, supra note 151, at 337. When a homeowner retains possession, taxes 
are likely to be paid, which generates revenue for local government and schools. Fur­
ther, home values are not depressed by low foreclosure sales. In addition, homeowners 
have incentive to work, which helps economic recovery. 
238. Id. at 334-35. Many are critical of the Chapter 12 structure that prohibits the 
lender to recognize the appreciation of the collateral. If this fixed base line was re­
moved, then the undersecured problem would be minimized. 
239. See generally Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-Am., 102 F.3d 874, 876 
(7th Cir. 1996). 
240. Id. 
241. Geyer, supra note 151, at 339-40. 
242. Id. 
383 2008] LARGE-SCALE DISASTERS 
Most large-scale disasters expose the reality between those 
who have more and those who have less.243 Historically, society has 
collectively taken efforts to extend a helping hand to those who fall 
victim to such disasters.244 As noted above, during the Great De­
pression, allocating congressional funds was a less effective means 
to recover from a catastrophe.245 Rules and regulations have 
worked better to create a more effective recovery system. Overall, 
the cramdown measure extends assistance to disaster victims at 
nominal cost to governments, businesses, and individuals.246 
Some lenders argue that a cramdown measure increases the 
debtor's wealth and decreases the creditor's equity.247 The right to 
foreclose permits the lender to elect to foreclose and recapture the 
home's value at the current levels or to defer foreclosure intending 
to hedge for future appreciation.248 The cramdown measure, in its 
most basic form, makes the decision for the lender. The Chapter 12 
scheme suspends foreclosure and destroys the lender's right to elect 
whether or not to carry the mortgage, thereby allocating apprecia­
tion to the debtor.249 Because the post-disaster recovery period is 
so pivotal to both parties and decisions must be made relatively 
quickly, the decision to make cramdown measures available must 
be made long before the unfortunate circumstances rear their ugly 
heads. 
A cramdown measure in response to large-scale disasters 
should integrate the concept of shared appreciation between home­
owner and lender.250 Sharing the home's appreciation is the most 
pragmatic approach to balancing each party's interests in the wake 
of a cramdown. Shared appreciation minimizes transfer of wealth 
from the lender to the homeowner and seeks to place both parties 
in the position they would have been in but for the disaster. More­
over, little wealth transfers from richer citizens to poorer citizens 
243. White, supra note 200, at 23. 
244. Wright, supra note 11, at 242, 246. 
245. See generally supra Part I.e. 
246. 131 CONGo REC. 16,924 (1985) (statement of Rep. Synar). The policy reme­
dies in the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act required no allocation of taxpayer money, 
"this bill does not cost [the Treasury] one red cent." [d. 
247. White, supra note 200, at 23. 
248. [d. 
249. Id. 
250. See Geyer, supra note 151, at 341. 
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because policy-based remedies cost taxpayers very little to imple­
ment this measure of disaster relief.251 
Congress allocated $11.5 billion in Community Development 
Block Grant funds for areas impacted by Hurricane Katrina and 
Hurricane Rita.252 This is a patent transfer of wealth from the tax­
payer who has more, to the victim who has less.253 A cramdown 
measure, with shared appreciation, will not redistribute the wealth 
from the lender to the homeowner. 254 
The general rule in America is that freedom to contract exists 
for all.255 Upon entering the mortgage obligation, one is bound to 
fully comply, regardless of the circumstances.256 Many homeown­
ers take pride in ownership and in honoring their obligations to re­
pay outstanding debt. Affording homeowners the chance to pay 
the debt retains their dignity and self respect, which public policy 
recognizes as traditional farmer and homeowner values.257 
This issue is real. In one setting, the onus felt by an indebted 
person to repay debt strained a citizen of North Carolina into tak­
ing his life because he was unable to cope with the dire circum­
stances of undersecured debt and his momentary inability to meet 
his pecuniary obligation.258 No financial obligation, no matter the 
amount, is worth a person's life. Policy and law should encourage 
251. See generally Wright, supra note 11. This is one reason why the FHA was so 
successful in long-term recovery efforts during the Depression era. 
252. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 
119 Stat. 2680, 2779-80 (2005). 
253. Wright, supra note 11, at 242-43. The HOLC's focus was to thrust money 
into the mortgage market to reverse the tightening of available credit. Id. 
254. The idea of wealth transfer is difficult to quantify. It is merely a guessing 
game contingent on factors like appraisal value, consumer surplus, and market demand 
versus the property owner's valuation. See generally White, supra note 200, at 22-29 
(discussing redistribution of wealth in Chapter 12 bankruptcy cases). Lending institu­
tions argued that a cramdown measure would result in less credit availability because 
banks would withdraw from the market. Furthermore, the exiting lenders would justify 
high lending costs and interest rates passed to the farmer. Id. at 26-27. However, over 
time these fears were not realized. In fact, the interest rates remained at relatively 
normal levels and a very small number of agricultural lenders increased their interest 
rate. Given the farming credit crisis, the response was expected, with or without the 
cramdown provision. Banks implemented more conservative lending policies such as 
more reliance on cash flow and decreasing loans based on security interest in collateral. 
Geyer, supra note 151, at 339-41. 
255. See generally Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 448 
(1934); White, supra note 200, at 17. 
256. Id. 
257. 131 CONGo REc. 16,924 (1985) (statement of Rep. Synar). 
258. Id. 16,925-26 (statement of Rep. Jones). 
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parties to honor financial obligations while caring for those reeling 
from a large-scale catastrophe. 
E. Substitutes as Incentives 
Where a lender is subjected to cramdown provisions and incurs 
financial loss from the homeowner's delay in payments or failure to 
fully repay, substitutes should ameliorate the loss. The law should 
make certain "carrots," as well as "sticks," available to lenders 
whose secured mortgaged debt is reduced by cramdown mea­
sures.259 The intent of substitutes is to place the lender as close as 
possible to the original mortgage terms being fulfilled.260 Lenders 
are in the business to increase profit by increasing revenue or re­
ducing costs. While substitutes are not likely to increase a lender's 
revenue, they can reduce costs that lenders have in their business 
operations. Tax incentives and a goodwill system are discussed in 
turn. 
One incentive for lenders would be tax incentives to those sub­
jected to cramdowns.261 For example, a tax credit or deduction 
based on all or part of the bifurcated unsecured mortgage debt fi­
nancially benefits a lender and softens the financial blow. The re­
duction in tax revenue, admittedly, is a detriment to the general tax 
base because it reduces tax revenue from lending enterprises.262 
The lender would further benefit, in addition to the tax incentive, 
where the homeowner repays, in part or in full, the unsecured debt. 
Creating a system to rank or standardize a lender's recovery 
efforts is yet another incentive to enhance the goodwill of the lend­
ing institution.263 Just as borrowers are rated by a credit system, a 
259. Craig E. Marcus, Note, Beyond the Boundaries of the Community Reinvest­
ment Act and the Fair Lending Laws: Developing a Market-Based Framework for Gen­
erating Low- and Moderate-Income Lending, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 710, 724 (1996) 
(discussing the incentives and regulations surrounding the Community Reinvestment 
Act that seek to encourage lenders to make financing available to low- and moderate­
income communities). 
260. A gap created by reduced payments and security is filled by incentives that 
differ in terms from the original mortgage obligation. 
261. See, e.g., 1.R.c. § 165(a) (2006) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction any 
loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or 
otherwise. "). 
262. See id. Similar tax provisions can be implemented to benefit those lenders 
affected by the mortgage cramdown. 
263. This proposed goodwill concept is analogous to the State of Washington's or 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) efforts to establish goodwill by means of 
grading apple quality. The Supreme Court upheld the Washington State Apple Adver­
tising Commission's efforts to keep grade labeling on apple boxes sold in North Caro­
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lender can be evaluated on their efforts to help homeowners in a 
natural disaster.264 Although quantifying the value of goodwill im­
posed by such a system may seem complex, the benefits are sub­
stantiaL The lenders' enhanced reputation will help retain current 
borrowers and attract new customers.265 This is of particular im­
portance in an industry where lenders are constantly seeking to re­
tain and attract patrons. 
Tax deductions and a goodwill system cannot replace the origi­
nal terms of the mortgage contract. However, these incentive mea­
sures smooth over the scarring and gaps arising from the mitigation 
efforts that the cramdown provision affords. The incentive mea­
sures are of particular importance to the lender because cramdowns 
harshly reduce their valid, secured mortgage interest. 
The cramdown measure is not intended to be an absolute cure; 
rather a tool of last resort. This stiff, but reasonable, measure gives 
homeowners a fighting chance to pick themselves up and continue 
forward with relief efforts. A looming cramdown equalizes the bar­
gaining power during workout negotiations.266 As a result, fewer 
homes foreclose, fewer neighborhoods are economically depressed, 
lenders may receive payment in full, and the individual homeowner 
and community are empowered with an opportunity to overcome 
tremendous financial burdens.267 
lina, where a North Carolina statute prohibited labeling displayed on closed apple 
boxes. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Washington 
State, the nation's largest apple producer, has a specific agency to promote and protect 
the state apple industry, thereby protecting the goodwill of Washington apple farmers 
and sustaining their profits. Id. at 336-37. The apple industry views Washington State 
apples as equal or superior to those graded according to the USDA standards. Id. at 
351-52. That grading system is a tool that molds public perception which in turn bene­
fits Washington State farmers' reputation and pocketbook. Id. 
264. See Marcus, supra note 259, at 725-27. 
265. !d. at 718-19. 
266. White, supra note 200, at 26-27. The workout agreement is done in the 
shadow of the farmer's alternative of a Chapter 12 cramdown. Id. 
267. In comparing the cramdown provision to elements set forth by the Supreme 
Court in Blaisdell, the debate is on what is "reasonable." Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). First, the cramdown seeks to protect a vital community 
interest, homeownership. Id. at 444-45. Second, the legislation implementing 
cramdown provisions addresses the protection of the legitimate social interest of disas­
ter recovery and community sustainability. Id. at 445. Third, the provision is based on 
the appropriate and reasonable conditions of a large-scale disaster that significantly 
impacts lives, homes, and communities. Id. Fourth, conditions must consider both par­
ties because appreciation in the home's equity is recognized as secured debt and pay­
ments are based on the smaller secured debt-rather than on the original indebtedness. 
Id. at 445-46. Fifth, the cramdown provision is only limited to the particular disaster. 
Id. at 447. 
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CONCLUSION 
Thus, we see that recovery costs of natural disasters alone can 
be enormous as demonstrated by Hurricane Katrina's estimated 
property damages of $75 billion.268 If homeowners stumble into de­
fault and foreclosure results, the associated costs are significant for 
both the homeowner and lender.269 Furthermore, the ripple effect 
is widespread, impacting both communities and industries through 
depressed prices, lost revenues, and lost tax base.27o 
Empowering the contracting parties for long-term success, not 
ephemeral monetary aid, is the appropriate action to take. A stan­
dardized framework is the means by which lenders can determine 
future risk and associated costs, and homeowners are afforded 
knowledge of and access to mitigation measures. In considering 
less effective and more effective mitigation measures, organizing 
standardized relief provisions fosters the necessary post-disaster 
perspective for the homeowner and lender, and preserves, while not 
perfectly, both parties' prevailing contractual interests. The 
favorable, tangible end result is secured homeownership, dimin­
ished financial loss for the residential mortgage industry, and has­
tened community recovery. 
268. See Brown, supra note 1, at 34. 
269. Id. 
270. See id.; Hatcher, supra note 97. 
